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Affirming Our Common Humanity:
Regulating Landmines to Protect
Civilians and Children in the
Developing World
By MARY A. FERRER*
I. Introduction
In January 1994 in Malanje, Angola, little Tunisia became yet an-
other of the town's orphans. The six month old baby was found still
clinging to her mother's corpse three days after she had been killed
trying to harvest food.'
Three siblings died near the Guazapa volcano last weekend when
they stepped on a mine planted during the period of civil warfare.
Ironically, their parents had returned to the area only a few days
earlier. The children were four, six, and eight years old. Parts from
the three children's bodies were found as far as 30 metres from the
explosion site.2
As the number of antipersonnel landmines3 has increased dra-
matically worldwide in the last twenty-five years, stories like these are
more common, chronicling the rising number of civilians in develop-
ing countries injured from exploding landmines. According to the
U.S. Department of State's Office of International Security and
Peacekeeping Operations, 80 to 110 million landmines are deployed
* Member of the Class of 1997. B.S. Georgetown University, 1994. ie author
wishes to thank her parents, Dr. Antonio Ferrer and Purita Ferrer, for their constant sup-
port and encouragement.
1. Angela Hawke, Landmnines - A Scourge on Children, CMEM.P.EN FiFsT! (Winter
1994) (excerpted from Felds of Fire, World in Action, Granada Television) (visited Dec. 1.
1996) <http'/wvwv.oneworld.orgunicef/landminesl.html>.
2. Id. (describing one accident discovered during the United Nations Children's
Fund's (UNICEF) 1993 Mine Awareness Project in El Salvador).
3. Military use of landmines encompasses both antitank and antipersonnel
landmines. See Richard H. Johnson, Why Mines? A Militar Perspective, in CtLAMGv6 THE
Fm DS 30 (Kevin M. Cahill, M.D. ed., 1995) ("The most common vay to designate differ-
ences between land mines is by referring to them by type of target they are designed to
attack."). Unless otherwise indicated, this Note discusses only antipersonnel landmines,
boobytraps, or similar explosive devices.
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or stockpiled in sixty-two countries worldwide.4 Most of these
landmines were laid or produced in the past twenty to twenty-five
years.' According to the United Nations, ongoing and new mine
clearance operations extracted eighty thousand landmines worldwide
in 1993.6 In that same year, another 2.5 million landmines were
deployed.7
Although some perceive landmines as purely military weapons
targeting military combatants and objectives, the reality is that eighty
percent of landmine casualties are civilians, not soldiers.8 It is esti-
mated that landmines kill or maim approximately five hundred people
every day.9 Even more disheartening is the fact that a large number
of these civilian victims are children.10 The United Nations Children's
Fund (UNICEF) estimates that there is one landmine for every
twenty of the world's children."
Developing countries have been hardest hit by the global
landmine crisis. 12 Three developing countries, Cambodia, Angola,
and Afghanistan, harbor approximately twenty-eight million
landmines, which constitute eighty-five percent of the world's im-
planted landmines.13 The reasons for the current crisis are numerous.
A growing number of producers, combined with increasingly sophisti-
cated military technology, allow landmines to be scattered randomly
4. BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STAV-E, HIDDEN KILL-
ERS: THE GLOBAL LANDMINE CRISIS 1 (1994) [hereinafter HIDDEN KILLSRS]. However, it
is difficult to assess precisely the actual number of landmines. The United Nations,
UNICEF, and the International Committee for the Red Cross [hereinafter ICRC] estimate
that between 100 and 200 million landmines have been deployed worldwide. See Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, The Land Mine Crisis: A Humanitarian Disaster, FOREIGN AFF., Sept. 1994,
at 8; UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 1996 26 (1995) 1 hereinafter CHIL-
DREN 1996]; ICRC, Anti-personnel Mines: An Overview 1996 (last modified Sept. 26,
1996) <http://gvalnexl.icrc.orgicrcnews/4386.htm> [hereinafter ICRC Overview].
5. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH APNis PROJECT AND PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY 51 (Human Rights Watch ed., 1993) [hereinafter
DEADLY LEGACY]. According to U.S. Army Intelligence, 400 million mines have been
emplaced or stockpiled since World War II. Id. at 50.
6. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 4, at 2.
7. Id.
8. Cyrus Vance & Herbert S. Okun, Eliminating the Threat of Land Mines: A New
U.S. Policy, in CLEARING THE FIELDS, supra note 3, at 198-99.
9. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 4, at 1.
10. Hawke, supra note 1.
11. UNICEF, ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES: A SCOURGE ON CHILDREN 5 (1994)
[hereinafter SCOURGE ON CHILDREN].
12. See infra Part V.
13. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 4, at 1.
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and in larger quantities. 4 Furthermore, armed conflict has changed in
the post-Cold War era."5 A rising number of ethnic conflicts and out-
breaks are local or regional conflicts taking place between govern-
ment and rebel forces within one country, rather than
internationally.1 6 Because these types of low intensity conflicts often
take place in poor, developing countries, landmines are generally the
weapon of choice due to their effectiveness and their low cost.
17
Landmines have been deployed increasingly by government and guer-
rilla armies as an offensive weapon used to terrorize and control the
movements of civilians, a use which clearly violates international hu-
manitarian law.1s
The landmine crisis has had a devastating effect on the civilian
populations in developing countries.' 9 Landmines wreak havoc on the
economic, social, and political stability of such developing countries,
long after armed conflict has ended30 As UNICEF recognizes, "A
mine has no target. A mine recognises no ceasefire. Unable to distin-
guish between the footfall of a soldier in battle, or a child playing, it
lies in wait to kill and maim. 12 1 Furthermore, landmines differ from
other weapons by their long term consequences as a delayed reaction
weapon and the particularly egregious type of injury they inflict on
their victims.'
Existing international law does not adequately protect the inter-
ests of civilian populations, especially those in developing countries.23
Although Protocol H of the Conventional Weapons Convention2 4 (the
"Landmine Protocol") was established to regulate the use of
landmines, it has done little to protect civilians in practice. In re-
14. Id at 6-11.
15. Id at 9-10.
16. Id at 9. For example, in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique. and Nicaragua,
bitter internal conflicts have left millions of landmines hidden in their countries' land-
scapes. See id. at 44-52.
17. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at IS.
18. Id. at 23. For more detailed discussion of how landmine use %iolates international
humanitarian law, see infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See infra Part V.
21. Hawke, supra note 1.
22. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 5-7.
23. This proposition is discussed infra Part III.B.
24. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps, and
Other Devices (Protocol H) of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious Or
to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 19S0, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 16S-171, 19 LL.M. 1523,
1529-34 [hereinafter Landmine Protocol].
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sponse to the global landmine crisis and the failures of the Landmine
Protocol, a Review Conference of the Conventional 'Weapons Con-
vention was convened in 1996, but with only limited success.25 Orga-
nizations such as UNICEF26 and the International Committee of the
Red Cross27 (ICRC) advocate a complete and total ban on the pro-
duction, use, stockpiling, sale, and export of antipersonnel mines as
the only solution to the global landmine crisis and the only means to
adequately protect civilian populations in developing countries from
landmines' destructive and debilitating effects. 28 Unfortunately, the
Review Conference has failed to reach agreement on a total ban on
the use and production of landmines. 29 Their disagreem-nent is rooted
in the participants' differing opinions about the proper balance of hu-
manitarian and military interests that should be represented in a re-
vised Landmine Protocol.
30
This Note discusses the shortcomings of international law in regu-
lating the use of landmines as military weapons. It illustrates the ef-
fects of these shortcomings on the civilian populations of developing
countries, with special emphasis on the effect of landmir es on children
in developing countries. Part II provides a short summary of the argu-
ments for and against a total ban on the use of landmines. Parts III
and IV outline existing international regulation of landmine use, dis-
cussing both international humanitarian law and the Landmine Proto-
col, and conclude that current landmine use violates international
humanitarian law. Part V describes how the inadequate regulation of
landmine use has had detrimental effects on civilian populations in the
developing world. Part VI discusses how the use of landmines violates
children's rights under the United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child. Finally, in Part VII, this Note proposes that the only
solution to the landmine crisis in the developing world is a total ban
on the use and production of landmines. Recognizing that the inter-
national community did not achieve a total ban during the recent Re-
25. See ICRC, Third Session of the Review Conference of State Parties to the 1980 UN
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) (last modified May 8, 1996) <http/
gvalnexl.icrc.orgicrcnews/357a.htm> [hereinafter ICRC Third Session]; see also Barbara
Jean, Clearing the Perilous Road to Peace, IrN'L DEF. REv. EXTRA, Feb. 1, 1996, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Jande File.
26. CHILDREN 1996, supra note 4, at 41.
27. ICRC Overview, supra note 4.
28. Vance & Okun, supra note 8, at 205. Many other nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), including the Physicians for Human Rights and Humans Rights Watch, have also
taken this position. See generally DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5.
29. See Jean, supra note 25.
30. Id
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view Conference of the Conventional Weapons Convention, Part VII
also provides proposals for legal change in lieu of a total ban, and
suggests implementation of humanitarian programs that specifically
address the concerns of civilians in developing countries.
I. Basic Background on Antipersonnel Landmines
A. Landmines: What Are They?
A landmine is defined as "any munition placed under, on or near
the ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or ex-
ploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehi-
cle.' 31 Antipersonnel landmines are those which target persons and
combatants, rather than tanks or other military equipment. -  There
are over 340 types of antipersonnel landmines produced in 48 coun-
tries worldwide.33 The explosive content found in antipersonnel
landmines is purposely calculated to maim, not kill the victim.-
Two basic categories of antipersonnel landmines exist.3 5 The
most common category is the blast mine, which detonates when a per-
son or animal steps on it or when a wheel or other object applies pres-
sure.3 6 When blast landmines explode, there is a rapid air expansion
that tears off the victim's leg, resulting in the need for traumatic am-
putation.3 7 The second most common type of landmine is the frag-
mentation landmine.3 s When fragmentation landmines detonate,
small pieces of metal fragments shatter either directionally, or in a
radius surrounding the landmine.39 As a result, the blast victim suffers
from multiple metal fragments embedded in his or her body.'"
B. A Total Ban: Basic Arguments
Opponents of a total ban on the use and production of landmines
generally argue that the military utility of antipersonnel landmines is
31. Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, art. 2(1), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 163, 19 LLM. at
1530.
32. DEADLY LEGACy, supra note 5, at 18.
33. Id. at 19, 48.
34. Antipersonnel Landmines: Interviews with Dr. Chris Giannou and Thomas McNa-
mara (National Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 8, 1996) (tape on file with author) [hereinafter
NPR Broadcast].
35. Id.
36. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 19.
37. NPR Broadcast, supra note 34.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 19-20.
40. NPR Broadcast, supra note 34.
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unparalleled and cannot be replaced by any other military weapon.4 1
In January 1994, the ICRC conducted a symposium of military experts
to examine the utility of landmine use.42 They concluded: "No alter-
native meets military requirements in the way that anti..persormel...
mines do," and that landmines are the "most cost-effective system
available to the military. ' 43 Opponents of a total ban prefer to focus
on landmine removal techniques and export controls rather than im-
plementation of a ban on the use and production of landmines. a
Advocates of a total ban argue that their opponents do not con-
sider humanitarian interests at all in their quest to preserve military
use of antipersonnel landmines&5 They question the utility of military
landmine use, especially considering their indiscriminate effects on ci-
vilian populations.46 Furthermore, they contend that military experts
do not uniformly agree on the utility of landmines.4 7 One U.S. Marine
Corps Commandant General at the ICRC military symposium stated
that:
We kill more Americans with our mines than we do anybody else.
We never killed many enemy [sic] with mines ... I know of no
situation in the Korean War, nor in the five years I served in South-
east Asia, nor in Panama, nor in Desert Shield-Desert Storm where
our use of mine warfare truly channelized the enemy and brought
them into a destructive pattern .... In the broader sense, I'm not
aware of any operational advantage from broad deployment of
mines .... 48
Whatever their differences, both proponents and opponents of a total
ban on landmines can agree that developing countries have been
hardest hit by the recent proliferation of antipersonnel landmines
worldwide.
41. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 38.
42. See ICRC, Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] for the
Review Conference of the 1980 U.N. Conventions on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects, Annex 1I: Symposium of Military Experts on the Military Util-
ity of Anti-personnel Mines (last modified Mar. 1, 1994) <httpl/www.icrc.ch/ icrcnews/
2636.htm> [hereinafter ICRC Military Report].
43. Id.
44. See Thomas E. McNamara, The U.S. Approach Toward Land Mines: A Realistic
Policy for an Evolving Problem, in CLEAPNG THm FIELDS, supra note 3, at 60, 63-64.
45. See, eg., DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 333-34.
46. Id.; see also Jack H. McCall, Infernal Machines and Hidden Death: International
Law and Limits on the Indiscriminate Use of Land Mine Warfare, 24 GA. J. INT'L & CONIe.
L. 229, 274-76 (1994).
47. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 339.
48. I&
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M. Existing International Regulations on Landmine Use
The use of landmines during armed conflicts is regulated under
both customary and conventional international law 9 The doctrine of
jus in bello seeks to prevent humanitarian abuses during wars 3 and is
generally referred to as international humanitarian law. In order for
international law to protect civilians effectively during armed con-
flicts, two factors must be present.5' First, there must be a perceived
mutual interest among states supporting the movement to limit or
eradicate a type of weaponry.12 Second, there must exist a widely
shared belief among states that the specific type of weaponry is "at
odds with the basic dignity and self-esteem of the military profession,
and should be shunned. 53 Existing international law regulating
landmines fails to effectively protect civilian interests during armed
conflicts, largely because military interests nearly always outweigh hu-
manitarian interests in the formulation of international law regulating
landmines.54
A. Customary International Law Regulating Armed Conflicts
Four basic principles of international humanitarian law govern
military tactics and weaponry during armed conflicts.-' First, the prin-
ciple of discrimination requires that the tactic or weapon discriminate
between civilian and military targets.56 Second, the principle of pro-
portionality requires that the tactic or weapon only inflict harm that is
proportionate to the military utility being achieved.57 Third, the prin-
ciple of necessity mandates that military tactics or weapons inflict
harm only as is necessary and relevant to the prompt realization of the
49. See e.g., Richard Falk, Walking the Tightrope of International Humanitarian Law:
Meeting the Challenge of Land Mines, in CLEARING THE Fmt.os. supra note 3, at 69, 70-75.
50. Yves Sandoz, Turning Principles into Practice: The Challcnge for International
Conventions and Institutions, in C.ERNG Tm FiELS, supra note 3. at 179, 179.
51. Falk, supra note 49, at 72.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. ICRC Military Report, supra note 42. For example, at a January 1934 ICRC con-
ference of professional military personnel, conference participants concluded that antipe.r-
sonnel landmines are an essential part of military weaponry and actively resisted any
generalized ban on landmines. Id. They were, however, willing to condition use on some
generalized guidelines designed to encourage "all feasible precautions... to protect civil-
ians from the effect of mines." Id.
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legitimate military objective." Fourth, the principle of humanity re-
quires that the tactic or weapon does not cause injury or death in ways
that result in cruel or gratuitous suffering, especially with regard to
civilians and noncombatants.5 9
Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
("Additional Protocol I"),60 signed in 1977, codifies these principles
specifically to protect civilian victims during international armed con-
flicts. 6' The provisions of Additional Protocol I emphasize that "[i]n
any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited." 62
1. The Principle of Discrimination
Article 51(4) of Additional Protocol I expressly prohibits "indis-
criminate attacks," which are defined as "(a) those which are not di-
rected at a specific military objective" and "(b) those which employ a
method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific
military objective. '63 Article 51(5) further defines "indiscriminate" as
referring to a tactic or weapon likely to produce "an incidental loss of
civilian life, [or] injury to civilians ... which would ba excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.' 'b4
58. IL; see also Norman B. Smith, A Plea for the Total Ban of Land Mines by Interna-
tional Treaty, 17 Lov. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 507, 516 (1995).
59. Falk, supra note 49, at 75.
60. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), Aug. 15, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, 3-608, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1391-442 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. Additional
Protocol I has been accepted by the United States, but other nations have not accepted its
provisions. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 306-07 n.112 (describing the United States'
position with regard to Additional Protocol I). See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Aug. 15, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 609-699, 16 I.L.M. 1443,
1443-449 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
Additional Protocol II of this Convention extends the protections stated in the Addi-
tional Protocol I to victims of noninternational armed conflicts which are defined as con-
flicts between the armed forces of a state who is party to the treaty and the "dissident" or
"organized" armed forces, "which under responsible command, exercise such control over
a part of the territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations and to implement this Protocol." Al.
61. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 308-09.
62. Additional Protocol I, supra note 60, art. 35(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 I.L.M. at
1408.
63. 1l art. 51(4)(a)-(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
64. Id. art. 51(5)(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
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2. The Principles of Proportionality and Necessity
Article 35(2) states that "[i]t is prohibited to employ weapons,
projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering." 65 Attacks are prohibited
where they cause incidental loss of life and injury to civilians that
would be excessive in relation to the military objective anticipated!,',
Additional Protocol I also provides environmental protections as an
element of the necessity or proportionality principle, stating that "it is
prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are in-
tended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and se-
vere damage to the natural environment."
67
Encompassed in these two principles is the requirement of mini-
mizing harm to civilians during armed conflicts. This sentiment is fur-
ther codified in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution
2444 of 19 69 .6S This resolution prohibits launching attacks against ci-
vilians and requires that distinctions be made at all times between
combatants and members of the civilian population so that civilians
may be protected to the fullest extent.6 9 This statement of interna-
tional humanitarian law is generally perceived as authoritative and is
recognized by the United States as such.
7"
Additional Protocol I codifies these protections for civilians dur-
ing armed conflicts. Article 48 requires that military operations be
directed only against military objectives, not civilians. 71 Article 57(3)
requires that when it is possible to choose between several military
objectives, the choice should be made to select the least dangerous
attack so as to minimize the injury and loss of life to civilian popula-
tions during the military operation.71
65. Id art. 35(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 I.L.M. at 1409.
66. See id. arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26,29. 16 LUM. at 1413, 1416.
67. Id art. 35(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 I.L.M. at 1409.
68. See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 306 n.112 (discussing the -Resp.ct for
Human Rights in Armed Conflicts" resolution that was unanimously adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly on January 13, 1969).
69. Id
70. Smith, supra note 58, at 519 nn.S2-S3.
71. Additional Protocol I, supra note 60, art. 4S, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25,16 I.L.M. at 1412;
see also id art. 51(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413 (stating that the civilian popu-
lation shall not be the object of a military attack).
72. Id arts. 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29. 16 I.L.M. at 1416.
19961
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3. The Principle of Humanity
In the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg, the international com-
munity established the following:
That the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to ac-
complish during war is to weaken the military force of the enemy
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render
their death inevitable;
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be con-
trary to the laws of humanity.
73
Several classes of weaponry have been banned due to their inflic-
tion of superfluous suffering or injury in violation of this principle.74
For example, the St. Petersburg Declaration banned the use of light-
weight exploding projectiles, noting that there are "technical limits at
which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of hu-
manity."75 The Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Law and
Customs of War on Land banned the use of projectiles the purpose of
which is to diffuse asphyxiating gases,76 and the banned use of ex-
panding or "dum-dum" bullets.77
More recently, the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of
chemical and biological weapons have been banned by the interna-
tional community.78 The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of
poisonous gas and bacteriological warfare, based on these weapons'
infliction of unnecessary suffering and their inability to discriminate
between military and civilian targets.79 The 1972 Biological Weapons
73. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under
400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297, reprinted in THE LAWS OF
ARMED CoN icrs 102 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
Explosive Projectile Declaration].
74. See Smith, supra note 58, at 532-33.
75. See, e.g., Explosive Projectile Declaration, supra note 73, 138 Consol. T.S. at 298;
see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 312-13.
76. Declaration Concerning Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, 187 Consol. T.S. 456,
reprinted in THE LAws OF ARMED CoNFLicrs, supra note 73, at 105-07. This Declaration
restates the general principle of humanity and prohibits the use of "projectiles the sole
object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases." Id.
77. Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 187 Consol. T.S. 459,
reprinted in THE LAws OF ARMED CoNFLICS, supra note 73, at 109-11.
78. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 314-15.
79. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Jan. 22, 1925,26 U.S.T. 571,571-
75, 14 I.L.M. 49, 49-50.
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Convention went even further and extended a ban on the develop-
ment, production, stockpiling, and transfer of biological weapons. '
This was the first international agreement to ban not just the use but
also the production, stockpiling, and transfer of an entire category of
weapons. The Convention was enacted with the belief that any use of
these weapons "would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and
that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk."81
B. Governing the Use of Landmines by Treaty: The
Landmine Protocol
The international community recognized the need to specifically
regulate landmines in the Landmine Protocol. The Landmine Proto-
col was intended to reduce the harm to civilians from mine warfare
and to reinforce the fundamental principles of international humanita-
rian law in landmine regulation.s3 Unfortunately, due to its many
flaws, the Landmine Protocol has failed to achieve these goals."4 As a
result, customary international law provides civilians greater protec-
tion with respect to landmine use than the Landmine Protocol.85 Fur-
thermore, Human Rights Watch Arms Project has observed that "in
the decade since the Landmine Protocol entered into force,
[land]mine use has proliferated and attacks on civilians have multi-
plied manyfold. '' s6 In response, members of the Conventional Weap-
ons Convention, along with nongovernmental organizations such as
the ICRC, engaged in a three-session review conference to discuss,
among other things, how to address the shortcomings of the Landmine
Protocol and the inadequacies of the Convention.61
80. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Dec. 16,
1971, Annex, art. 1, 26 U.S.T. 583, 11 LLM. 309, 311 [hereinafter Biological Weapons
Convention].
81. Id. preamble, 26 U.S.T. at 585, 11 I.LM. at 309; see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra
note 5, at 315-16.
82. Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 16S-71, 19 I.L.M. at 1529-34.
83. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 262.
84. See id. at 263 (stating that even the Landmine Protocol's "modest restrictions have
not been followed in conflicts waged since its entry into force almost ten years ago.").
85. For detailed discussion of this point, see infra Part IV.
86. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 353.
87. See ICRC Third Session, supra note 25. For further discussion of the Conventional
Weapons Convention Review Conference, see infra Part IILB2.
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1. Shortcomings of the Landmine Protocol
Several factors contribute to the Landmine Protocol's failure to
protect civilians in developing countries from landmine injury.
a. No Unanimous Membership or Enforcement Mechanisms
Members of the international community who depT.oy landmines
have not unanimously accepted the Conventional Weapons Conven-
tion and its three original protocols.88 Furthermore, the Convention
does not establish an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance
by member states.89 In fact, the Landmine Protocol provides "no pro-
cedure for complaints, no mechanism for verification, [and] no conse-
quences of noncompliance of even a flagrant character." 90
b. The History of the Landmine Protocol: Military Interests
Trump Humanitarian Interests
The failures of the Landmine Protocol are rooted in its historical
development. During the Lucerne Conference, convened to draft the
Conventional Weapons Convention, participants considered whether
the use of landmines violated international humanitarian law; specifi-
cally, they considered whether landmine use violated the legal prohi-
bition against weapons causing superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering.9' However, when drafting the Convention, the parties could
not agree on the appropriate balance between humanitarian necessi-
ties and military interests to be incorporated in the provisions of the
Convention.92 The majority of the participants believed essentially
that landmines were "necessary defensive weapons," despite the par-
ticular danger these weapons pose to civilians.93
What is particularly alarming about the Lucerne Conference is
that the participants "virtually ignored the most problematic features
88. As of September 15, 1996, 62 states, including the United States (excluding Proto-
col III dealing with incendiary weapons), China, France (also excluding 3?rotocol III), the
United Kingdom, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, had ratified the Conventional Weapons Con-
vention. ICRC, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conven-
tional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects: States Which Have Adhered to the Convention (last modified Sept.
15, 1996) <http'//gvalnexl.icrc.org/icrcnews/2392.htm>. Two states, Benin and Jordan, have
ratified the Convention but do not accept the Landmine Protocol. Id
89. Falk, supra note 49, at 79.
90. Id
91. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 268.
92. Id at 268-69.
93. Id at 271.
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of mine warfare: the unique long-term risk to civilians created by the
delayed-action quality of landmines; the severity of mine injuries; and
the resulting massive devastation of civilian populations."'14 The par-
ticipants also did not take seriously the inevitably indiscriminate ef-
fects caused by landmines' delayed-reaction feature. s The economic
costs and practical difficulties of mine clearance were only cursorily
mentioned, while other humanitarian concerns relating to the social
and health effects on civilians from landmine use were virtually ig-
nored. 6 The records of the Lucerne Conference disclose that military
interests favoring the continued availability of landmines as a weapon
of war severely outweighed humanitarian concerns.97
This fundamental imbalance between humanitarian and military
interests continued to plague the Review Conference of the Conven-
tional Weapons Convention.93 Dissension as to the proper balance
between humanitarian and security issues persisted, varying from
country to country.99 This fundamental disagreement is one of the
primary points of controversy over which landmine regulation is con-
cerned and one of the principal reasons a total ban has not been
achieved to date."co Military interests continue to trump civilian inter-
ests, effectively impeding consensus among participants of the Review
Conference. Until the balance tips towards humanitarian interests,
landmine regulation under the Conventional Weapons Convention
and the Landmine Protocol will fail to protect civilians from the de-
structive effects of landmines. 101
94. 1&
95. Id. at 274.
96. 1l at 274-75.
97. fd at 272-73.
98. Jean, supra note 25. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the Conventional
Weapons Convention's Review Conference.
99. l
100. See id. (discussing the results of the first session of the Review Conference and
quoting one participant as stating that the proper balance between humanitarian and mili-
tary requirements with respect to landmine regulation "is different for different
countries.").
101. For a more detailed discussion of this proposition, see Paul J. Lightfoot, Comment,
The Landmine Reviv Conferenca" Will the Revised Landinine Protocol Protect Civiians?,
18 FoRHAiM IN-'L LJ. 1526, 1558 (1995) (concluding that these differences between mem-
ber states would result in inadequate protection for civilians in a revised Landmine
Protocol).
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c. Lackluster Provisions in the Landmine Protocol Fail to
Protect Civilians, Offering Less Protection than
Additional Protocol I Mandates
The weak language of the Landmine Protocol provides civilians
in developing countries with only minimal protection from landmines.
Rife with internal conflicts and inconsistent language, the specific pro-
visions of the Landmine Protocol fail to conform with humanitarian
law requirements as codified in Additional Protocol .1)2
Considering the Landmine Protocol's historical development, it is
not surprising that its provisions inadequately consider humanitarian
interests and place noncombatants at an unnecessarily high risk of in-
jury during armed conflicts.1 "3 Its provisions suggest a bias favoring
military interests that reflects the disagreement among the drafters re-
garding the military necessity of landmines. °' Although the Pream-
ble of the Conventional Weapons Convention purports to protect "the
civilian population and combatants" under "the principles of interna-
tional law derived from established custom, and from the principles of
humanity and from the dictates of public conscience,"'( 5 the individ-
ual provisions of the Landmine Protocol do not adequately promote
these concerns. As implemented, these provisions jeopardize civilian
interests during armed conflicts and ignore the safeguards mandated
by Additional Protocol I.1 6
The Landmine Protocol broadly prohibits "in all circumstances"
any military action in which landmineS 0 7 are directed "either in of-
fence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as
102. For discussion of the international humanitarian law principles codified in Addi-
tional Protocol I, see supra Part III.B.
103. See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 272-73 (discussing the Lucerne Confer-
ence). The authors noted that:
Although conference participants professed to strike a balance between humani-
tarian and military considerations, in fact their analysis was fatally incomplete.
They placed unduly heavy emphasis on military need, in part because of now
obsolete mine warfare. On the other hand, they seriously underestimated the
human costs of landmine use .... Conference participants also failed to give full
consideration to the inefficacy of seeking to apply the proportionality principle to
the use of a delayed-reaction weapon.
Id.
104. Id
105. Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, preamble, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 164, 19 I.L.M. at
1524.
106. See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 306-10.
107. Because the scope of this Note is limited to discussion of antipersonnel landmines
and their effects, this section will only refer to the Landmine Protocol provisions regulating
antipersonnel landmines. However, the Landmine Protocol also appl es to the use of
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such or against individual civilians.""' Nevertheless, subsequent pro-
visions in the Landmine Protocol effectively undermine the power of
this broad prohibition, rendering it meaningless in practice.
For example, Article 3 of the Landmine Protocol addresses gen-
eral restrictions on the use of landmines, 0 9 enumerating several pro-
hibited "indiscriminate" uses predicated on the distinction between
civilian objects and military objectives.110 However, this distinction
"is difficult to maintain once a military target has moved away from a
mined area, leaving behind antipersonnel mines." '' Furthermore,
Article 3 requires only that parties in an armed conflict take "all feasi-
ble precautions" necessary "to protect civilians from the effects of"
landmines. 112 It defines "feasible" as "those precautions which are
practicable or practically possible taking into account all circum-
stances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military consid-
erations."" 3 In practice, however, "feasible" is a weak term open to
considerable interpretation by military forces laying landmines."'I As
mines, booby traps, and other devices, as specifically defined in Article 2. Landmine Pro-
tocol, supra note 24, arts. 2(2)-(3), 3(1)(a)-(e), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 16S-69, 19 I.LM. at 1530.
108. Id. art. 3(2), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.LM. at 1530.
109. Article 3(3) of the Landmine Protocol prohibits three -indiscriminate" u-es of
landmines, defined as any placement:
(a) which is not on, or directed at, a military objective; or
(b) which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a
specific military objective; or
(c) which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civil-
ians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be exces-
sive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Id art. 3(3), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at 1530.
110. The Landmine Protocol defines "military objective" as "any object w:hich by its
nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage." Id. art. 2(4), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 16S, 19 LL.M.
at 1530. "Civilian objects" are defined by the Landmine Protocol as "all objects which are
not military objectives as defined in paragraph 4." Id. art. 2(5), 142 U.N.T.S. at 163, 19
I.L.M. at 1530.
111. Sandoz, supra note 50, at ISS. Furthermore, it is arguable that landmine use is
prohibited by the terms of the Landmine Protocol itself. Indiscriminate is defined as any
landmine placement "which may be expected to cause incidental loss of ci% ilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excassive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." Landmine Proto:ol,
supra note 24, art. 3(3)(c), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at 1530. Landmine use in any
capacity has not just "incidental" effects, but leaves a devastating impact on civilian popu-
lations both during and after the armed conflict. See infra Parts V and VI.
112. Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, art. 3, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 LLM. at 1530
(emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. Sandoz, supra note 50, at 188.
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a result, this language significantly undercuts the broad duty to protect
civilians promulgated in Article 3(2). n s
Article 4 of the Landmine Protocol is similarly inconsistent, ad-
dressing nonremotely delivered mines specifically:
It is prohibited ... [to lay mines] in any city, town, village, or other
area containing a similar concentration of civilians in which combat
between ground forces is not taking place or does not appear to be
imminent, unless either
(a) they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military
objective belonging to or under the control of an adverse
party; or
(b) measures are taken to protect civilians from their ef-
fects, for example, the posting of warning signs, the p9sting
of sentries, the issue of warnings, or the provision of
fences. 116
Although this provision begins with a strong prohibition against
landmine placement in civilian areas, the two exceptions to this prohi-
bition essentially nullify the prohibition, thereby failing to effectively
protect civilians from the effects of landmines delivered by hand.
Article 5 of the Landmine Protocol prohibits the use of remotely
delivered landmines except where "their location can be accurately
recorded" or where they are equipped with "an effective neutralizing
mechanism... designed to render a mine harmless or cause it to de-
stroy itself. 11 7 Riddled with these exceptions, this provision fails to
adequately protect civilians because there is no guarantee that re-
motely delivered landmines will actually self-destruct or self-neutral-
ize.118 Furthermore, installing these mechanisms is very costly.11 9
Many developing countries resist such a requirement, arguing that it
would place them at a military disadvantage to wealthier countries
who can better afford to purchase landmines equipped with expensive
115. See id.
116. Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, art. 4(2)(a)-(b), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 NL.M.
at 1531 (emphasis added).
117. Id. art. 5(1)(a),(b), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.L.M. at 1531.
118. Self-destructing or neutralizing mechanisms often malfunction, thereby failing to
neutralize or destroy the landmine; their failure rate is estimated to be about 10%. Vance
& Okun, supra note 8, at 207. In contrast, humanitarian mine clearance, in comparison to
military mine clearance, finds any number less than 99.9% unacceptable; in other words,
landmines must be destroyed or neutralized 99.9% of the time, a mere 10% rate is entirely
inadequate. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 236-37. Such a high percentage is neces-
sary to offer civilians peace of mind and freedom from any possible landmine injury. See
Vance & Okun, supra note 8, at 208.
119. Sandoz, supra note 50, at 190.
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self-destruct or self-neutralize features.120 Unfortunately, it is devel-
oping countries "that suffer most from the effects of mines, and in
which the concept of the 'military utility' of these weapons becomes
absurd in view of the economic and social costs to which they give
rise.' 121 Therefore, as a practical matter, Article 5 offers minimal pro-
tection of civilian interests.
Additionally, the recording requirement in Article 5 is signifi-
cantly undercut by the recording provisions of Article 7 that only re-
quire parties to record the location of "all pre-planned minefields laid
by them."'" Furthermore, Article 7 merely suggests that parties "en-
deavour to ensure the recording of the location of all other minefields
... which they have laid or placed in position."'' 1  This weak language
does not consider the interests of the civilian returning to farm his or
her land, unaware that landmines lay in his or her fields. Moreover,
the Landmine Protocol does not recognize that even when landmine
fields are recorded by parties, their maps are frequently inaccurate,
due to human error or simply because mines can move from their
original location over time.124 Since the Landmine Protocol was en-
acted, no armed force is known to have consistently and accurately
recorded the locations of their minefieldsY1s
Article 9 of the Landmine Protocol governs parties' plans for re-
moving landmines at the conclusion of an armed conffict. 126 Unfortu-
nately, this Article does not impose an affirmative obligation to
120. ld. at 189 (noting that "[i]t is thus the poorer countries that put up the most vigor-
ous opposition to a total ban on antipersonnel mines or a general obligation to fit all mines
with self-destruct or self-neutralizing mechanisms").
121. Id.
122. Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, art. 7(1)(a), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 170. 19 I.L.M. at
1532 (emphasis added). To add to the ineffectiveness of this provision, the Landmine Pro-
tocol provides no definition of "pre-planned." Sandoz, supra note 50, at 189.
123. Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, art. 7(2), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 170. 19 I.L.M. at
1532 (emphasis added).
124. Sandoz, supra note 50, at 190. One example of a recording failure is the case of the
Falkland or Malvinas Islands. During the war between the United Kingdom and Argen-
tina which ended in 1982, 117 minefields were recorded. HIDDEN KuEnrs,supra note 4, at
22. However, the exact location of the mines on the Islands is unknown because "So% of
the mines are laid in peat and beach sand, both of which are subject to movement." Id. It
is likely that mines laid in 1982 have moved considerably and are no longer in their re-
corded areas. Id.
125. Smith, supra note 58, at 29.
126. Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, art. 9, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171, 19 I.L.M. at 1539.
Article 9 provides that "[a]fter the cessation of active hostilities, the parties shall endeavour
to reach agreement, both among themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and
with international organizations, on the provision of information and technical and mate-
rial assistance-including, in appropriate circumstances, joint operations-necessary to re-
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remove landmines, but only requires that parties "endeavour to reach
agreement" on their removal. 27 Moreover, Article 9 does not require
warring parties to offer assistance to international organizations that
may be performing mine clearance. Rather, it asks only that the war-
ring parties provide information "necessary" to remove mines. 128
Finally, the Landmine Protocol is ineffective because until very
recently, it did not apply to noninternational, or "unconventional"
war.129 This deficiency has seriously affected civilians in developing
countries where "the rules of war are least likely to be obeyed. '130
Landmines are most often used against civilian populations as an of-
fensive weapon during internal or civil wars.' 3' Forces in these types
of armed conflicts use landmines to overcome the "low force-to-space
ratio typical of insurgency-counterinsurgency and many internal
wars." 32 In order to control their movements, civilians are targeted
and terrorized by both sides of the conflict. 13 3 Furthermore, because
mines continue to injure and kill long after an armed conflict has
ended, landmines act as destabilizing forces for the new political re-
gime in power.13 4 Therefore, the Landmine Protocol's failure to apply
to internal conflicts has contributed to civilian landmine injuries in-
curred during post-Cold War civil wars in the developing world. 13
The Landmine Protocol's less than satisfactory regulations pro-
vide only the most minimal consideration of civilians' interests. In
general, observers have noted that "[c]omplex rules, discretionary lan-
guage, and broad exceptions and qualifications further limit the utility
of the Landmines Protocol."'
136
move or otherwise render ineffective minefields, mines and booby-traps placed in position
during the conflict." Id. (emphasis added).
127. See id.; see also Sandoz, supra note 50, at 190. Another shortcoming of Article 9 is
its failure to discuss repatriation, land-reclamation, and other issues crucial to "a mine-
devastated" country once a war has ended. Sandoz, supra note 50, at 190.
128. Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, art. 9, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171, 19 I.L.M. at 1539.
129. See Jean, supra note 25.
130. J. Bryan Hehir, Land Mines: A Political-Moral Assessment, h CLEARINO Tim
FIELDS, supra note 3, at 97, 104.
131. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 22-23.
132. Ia. at 22. Landmines "are used principally as area denial weapons, useful in over-
coming the low force-to-space ratio typical of such conflicts." Id. at 9.
133. Id. at 23.
134. Id.
135. See Hehir, supra note 130, at 104-05 (discussing the rise in intrastate conflicts after
the Cold War and how the use of landmines in these conflicts represents an indiscriminate
method of war).
136. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 8.
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2. The 1995-1996 Review Conference of the Conventional
Weapons Convention and the Landmine Protocol:
Disagreement Persists
In light of the Landmine Protocol's many shortcomings and
against the backdrop of a global landmine crisis, the ICRC and state
members of the Convention pushed for a meeting of the international
community to amend and modify its articles. 137 After two years of
preparation, the 1995-1996 Review Conference [the "Review Confer-
ence"] began in Vienna on September 25, 1995.1-'s Comprised of three
separate sessions, 39 the Review Conference of the Conventional
Weapons Convention produced some changes in existing landmine
regulation, but failed to promulgate a total ban on the use and produc-
tion of landmines, despite support for such a ban by nearly half of the
fifty-one Convention member states present at the last session of the
Review Conference. 14° Underlying their disagreement was the con-
tinuing fundamental difference of opinion as to what the proper bal-
ance between humanitarian and military interests should be with
regard to landmine use.
141
However, the participants to the Review Conference came to a
consensus on several modifications of the Landmine Protocol that
should offer civilians some additional protection from the effects of
landmines. 142 First, the members agreed to extend the Landmine Pro-
tocol to noninternational armed conflicts.' 4 Second, members agreed
that the location of all mines must be mapped and recorded, ex-
tending this requirement beyond only "pre-planned" minefields as
stated in the original provision.144 Another important change is the
137. See ICRC, The ICRC and the Review Conference of the 19S0 U.N. Convention on
Certain Conventional Weapons, (visited Dec. 1, 1996) <http:llgvalnexl.icrcoorgficrcnewi
37ee.htm> [hereinafter ICRC Vienna Review Session].
138. Id.
139. Id. The first session of the Review Conference took place in Vienna btween Sep-
tember 25 and October 13, 1995. Id. The second session took place in Geneva, January 15-
19, 1996. Review Conference of the 19S0 U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Wcap-
ons: Geneva Session, 15-19 January 1996, ICRC NEWS (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross).
January 30, 1996, at 1 (photo. reprint of subsequently modified internet site, on file with
author) [hereinafter Geneva Review Session]. The third and final session was also held in
Geneva, April 22 to May 3, 1996. ICRC Third Session, supra note 25.
140. ICRC Third Session, supra note 25 (noting that "only minimal restrictions on
[landmine] use were adopted following two years of tortuous negotiations.").
141. For a detailed discussion of why the Review Conference failed to implement pro-
tections for civilians, see Lightfoot, supra note 101, at 1558.
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explicit assignment of responsibility for landmine clearance to those
who deployed the mines. 45 Furthermore, in an effort to improve
compliance, the amended Landmine Protocol will require member
states to enact penal legislation to deter serious violations of its provi-
sions. 46 The participants also agreed to improve the protection of
humanitarian workers by requiring that heads of relief missions be
provided with the location of minefields and other information.'47
Unfortunately, new regulations on landmine use are minimal.
The use of both antihandling devices and remotely-delivered
landmines is still permitted. 48 So-called "dumb" landmines, those not
equipped with self-destruction or neutralization devices, must be
placed in fenced, marked, and guarded areas except when direct en-
emy military action prevents such activity.' 49 In contrast, "smart"
mines, when deployed outside of marked, fenced, or guarded areas,
must be equipped to self-destruct within 30 days with 90% reliability,
self-deactivate within 120 days with 99.9% reliability, and be detecta-
ble. 5 ° While these provisions might sound positive, it is unfortunate
that they will not become effective until the next decade.' 5' In addi-
tion, all of the new regulations discussed above will not become effec-
tive until twenty states consent to be bound by the amended
Landmine Protocol.152 The ICRC estimates that this process will take
two to three years.'
53
This complex regulatory scheme simply does not offer civilians
the protection to which they are entitled under international humani-
tarian law and Additional Protocol I.1 4 Furthermore, without an en-
forcement system to verify compliance, mere modifications in the
existing yet ineffective Landmine Protocol will do little to alleviate the
severe effects of landmine use. By focusing only on restrictions rather








152. Id By its terms, the amended Landmine Protocol will only enter into force six
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col may "spark a new phase of armament.""15 Commenting on the
progress of the Review Conference after the first session, a British
defense journal noted that:
Many proposals in circulation [at the Review Conference] are
aimed at alleviating the landmine problem with the increased use of
self-destructing mines and new requirements for detectability.
Though acknowledging this as somewhat of a step forward, agencies
are still concerned that this method could lead to an overall increase
in the use and transfer of mines, particularly if it is mistakenly be-
lieved that such mines are less threatening to civilians, or users at-
tempt to compensate for [landmines'] short life through larger
numbers being laid.15
6
This prediction may prove correct. The ICRC suggests that the Re-
view Conference has implicitly encouraged the "production, transfer,
and use" of smart landmines and "promote[d] the development and
use of new weapons." 57
The Review Conference, like the Lucerne Conference convened
to draft the Conventional Weapons Convention, was plagued by a fun-
damental imbalance: civilian interests continued to be outweighed by
military interests in preserving the landmine as a weapon of war.1'5
By focusing on more complex technical restrictions on mine use rather
than on a complete ban, the participants of the Review Conference
failed to recognize and respond to the indiscriminate and destructive
effect landmines have on civilians, both during and after an armed
conflict. 159 In sum, the amended Landmine Protocol offers little in the
155. ICRC Geneva Review Session, supra note 139, at 2. "[N]egotiations aimed at limit-
ing the types of mines that can be manufactured and how they are deployed could only
spark a new phase of armament with the weapons." ld.
156. Jean, supra note 25.
157. ICRC Third Session, supra note 25.
158. See ICRC Geneva Review Session, supra note 139, at 3. Peter Walker of the Inter-
national Federation accurately predicted "The debate [during the Review Conference] is in
danger of being side-tracked. This is not a technical debate, it is a humanitarian one." Id.
at 2.
159. According to advocates of a total ban on the use of landmines, "these piecemeal
negotiations are doomed" when one considers that "[m]apping minefields is ineffective
when mines are strewed from helicopters ... and regulating mines' metal content is unen-
forceable." John Mintz, A Global Bid to Ban Mines: Devices Kill or Wound 26,000 P&ople
Each Year, WASH. PosT, Feb. 4, 1996, at Al (noting that "the diplomats in Geneva are not
discussing a mine ban, but more modest restrictions [on landmine use]"). Dr. Chris Gian-
nou, a long-time ICRC war surgeon, explained that such technical restrictions on landmine
use will ultimately fail to protect civilians because "[ylou end up with a complex set of rules
that won't work." Id.
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way of additional protections for civilians, and might inadvertently
promote the use of landmines in civilian areas.
IV. Landmine Use Violates International Humainitarian Law
As discussed above, the Landmine Protocol does not offer civil-
ians meaningful protection from landmines, despite the Conventional
Weapons Convention's broad incorporation of international humani-
tarian law as one of its guiding principles.160 The Convention's pre-
amble states that civilian populations "shall at all times remain under
the protection and authority of the principles of international law de-
rived from established custom, from the principles of humanity, and
from the dictates of public conscience."'1 61 Landmine use clearly vio-
lates the principles of jus in bello.161 Therefore, landmines should be
banned as a category of weapons based on the tenets of customary
international law and the provisions of the Additional Protocol I. 1 3
A. Landmines Are Indiscriminate Weapons, the Use of Which
Violates International Humanitarian Law
Additional Protocol I requires that parties to an armed conflict
distinguish between military and civilian targets at all times during the
conflict, and must only direct operations against military objectives,1 64
Where there is doubt as to status, Additional ProtocoL I provides a
presumption of civilian status. 165 It prohibits indiscriminate attacks
that "are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civil-
ian objectives without distinction.' 66 Under its provisions "an attack
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
160. For a more detailed discussion of customary international law as applied to armed
conflicts and landmine use, see supra Part III.
161. Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, preamble, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 164, 19 I.L.M. at
1524.
162. See supra Part III. See also Sandoz, supra note 50.
163. Additional Protocol I,supra note 60, art. 1(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7. 16 I.L.M. at 1412
(stating that during warfare "civilians and combatants remain under the protection and
authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience").
164. Id. art. 48, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 25, 16 I.L.M. at 1412 ("In order to ensure respect for
and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and ... ac-
cordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives."); I'd. art. 51(2), 1125
U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413 ("The civilian population as such, as well as individual
civilians, shall not be the object of attack.").
165. Id. art. 50(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413.
166. Id. art. 51(4)(a)-(c), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at 1413 (giving three specific
examples of what is considered an indiscriminate military attack).
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to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct mili-
tary advantage anticipated" is considered indiscriminate and is there-
fore prohibited. 67 However, the use of landmines has caused much
more than an "incidental" loss of civilian life.1 6s Accordingly,
landmine use violates the principle of discrimination as described in
Additional Protocol I.
First, the practice of delivering landmines by air is itself evidence
of indiscriminate use.'69 Ideally, remotely-delivered landmines are
dropped from airplanes and float to the ground where a military ob-
jective is targeted. 70 However, weather conditions and other factors
often alter where the landmine finally falls, often placing it in civilian
areas.' 71 One remotely delivered landmine has been so widely
deployed outside military areas that it is commonly known to civilians
as the "green parrot."'"7 As a practical matter, remotely delivered
landmines cannot be accurately mapped so as to facilitate their re-
moval once an armed conflict has ended.1 73 Furthermore, the provi-
sions of the Landmine Protocol permit the placement of landmines in
civilian areas so long as measures are taken to "protect civilians from
their effects."'174 However, no specific provisions describe what such
measures should provide. The practice of remote delivery is only one
example of how landmine use violates the principle of discrimination
by failing to effectively distinguish between civilian and military
objectives.
Second, landmines are indiscriminate weapons due to their
delayed-reaction operation. 175 They are designed "not for immediate
effect, but rather are primed, concealed, and lie dormant until trig-
gered."'176 Because of the lag time between when the landmine is
deployed and when it actually detonates, many landmines remain ac-
167. Id. art. 51(5)(b), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 LL.M. at 1413.
168. For a discussion of the effects of landmines on civilians, see infra parts V and VI.
169. See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5. at 273-76.
170. Id. at 26.
171. See id. at 26, 343-44.
172. Id. at 298. The PFM-1 is a Soviet-made mine which is shaped like a small toy
airplane with wings. Id. It floats to the ground where it can be detonated by any pressure
on its body, caused by stepping on or handling the landmine. Id. Illustration can be found
on page 158 of this Note.
173. Id. at 344-45.
174. Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, art. 4(2)(b), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169, 19 I.LM. at
1531.
175. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 5.
176. Id.
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4 '.
The Soviet-made PFM-1 is a small air-delivered plastic landmine known in
Afghanistan as the "Green Parrot." Many Afghan children have been killed
or maimed by this landmine, mistaking it for a toy.
Drawing by Pamela Blotner for Arms Project and Physicians for Human Rights. Re-
printed by permission. Originally published in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Ailms PROJECT
AND PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY (Human
Rights Watch ed. 1993).
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tive in the ground long after the armed conflict has ended.1" The
Human Rights Watch Arms Project noted that:
Unlike a bomb or artillery shell which explodes when it approaches
or hits its target, a landmine lies dormant until a person, vehicle, or
animal triggers its firing mechanism. Landmines are blind weapons
that cannot distinguish between the footfall of a soldier and that of
an old woman gathering firewood. They recognize no ceasefire and,
long after the fighting has stopped, they can maim or kill the chil-
dren and grandchildren of the soldiers who laid them.
17S
Because the Landmine Protocol does not mandate self-destructing or
self-neutralizing mechanisms on all landmines,'" the weapon's
delayed reaction operation will continue to harm civilians who have
no choice but to return to landmine-ridden areas once the fighting has
stopped. s° Accordingly, the landmine's delayed reaction mechanism
makes it an indiscriminate weapon of war.
Third, the increasingly common use of landmines as an offensive
weapon employed to terrorize civilian populations violates the princi-
ple of discrimination during armed conflicts. Such actions violate Ad-
ditional Protocol I, which states that "[a]cts or threats of violence the
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian popu-
lation are prohibited.""ls" Additionally, the Landmine Protocol exac-
erbated this problem because it did not extend to noninterational
armed conflicts in its original form.'- As guerrilla warfare and inter-
nal insurgency conflicts have become increasingly common in the
177. Kenneth Anderson, An Overview of the Global Land Mine Crisis, in CLEAP.iNG
ThE FIELDs, supra note 3, at 17, 17. Landmine longevity is exemplified by World War II
landmines, which continue to kill and maim people. Johnson, supra note 3, at 2(1. In
France, since 1946, 630 de-miners have died, and IS million artillery shells, 10 million gre-
nades, and 600,000 aerial bombs have been found and destroyed; nevertheless, in 1991, 36
farmers died and another 51 civilians were injured by unexploded landmines. Id. In Po-
land, 25 million mines have been cleared from the country to date. DEADLY LEGAc ,
supra note 5, at 5-6. However, as late as 1977, 30 to 40 people were killed annually by
exploding landmines laid in Poland during World War II. Id.
178. Id. at 3.
179. See supra Part MI.B. for a discussion of the Landmine Protocol's provisions.
180. See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 286-94. Unfortunately, most landmines are
not detonated immediately during the armed conflict, because "once several soldiers are
killed after moving across the minefield, the rest bypass it." Id. at 2SM3, This leaves
many unexploded landmines for civilians returning to generally unmarked minefields
which have now become a part of their homeland. Id. Thus, the majority of landmincs
deployed during armed conflicts are detonated by civilians, after the conflict has ended.
181. Additional Protocol I, supra note 60, art. 51(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 26, 16 I.L.M. at
1413.
182. The participants of the Review Conference have agreed to extend the pro'isions
of the Landmine Protocol to noninternational or internal armed conflicts. ICRC Third
19961
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
post-Cold War era,'8 3 landmines are more frequently deployed as the
offensive weapon of choice.'84 To make up for a low number of com-
batants during guerrilla warfare, military leaders in these conflicts de-
ploy landmines to compensate for "the low force-to-space ratio typical
of insurgency-counterinsurgency and many internal wars."'185
Although theoretically landmines can be directed exclusively at
legitimate military targets, "they have shifted from being primarily a
defensive, tactical battlefield weapon to an offensive, strategic weapon
often aimed deliberately at civilians in order to empty territory, de-
stroy food sources, create refugee flows, or simply spread terror.'
8 6
Using landmines as a way to terrorize and control the movement of
civilians clearly violates the tenets of international humanitarian
law.' 7 Although the Landmine Protocol will now apply to internal
conflicts, it is unlikely that its provisions can be effectively enforced
against nonprofessional military forces. Furthermore, there is no way
to ensure such forces will adhere to its provisions voluntarily.
In light of these aspects of current landmine use, landmines
should be banned under international humanitarian law as illegal, in-
discriminate weapons. Current use of landmines, especially in devel-
oping countries, violates the principle of discrimination, because
landmines are being used in these countries to terrorize, rather than
protect, civilians during armed conflict.
B. Landmine Use Produces Egregious Injury in Violation of
International Humanitarian Law
The injury inflicted by landmines is horrifyingly different from
that inflicted by other military weaponry.'8 s ICRC war surgeon Chris
Giannou explained that:
Session, supra note 25. See supra Part mI.B.2 for a discussion of the 1995-1996 Review
Conference.
183. Hehir, supra note 130, at 103-04.
184. See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 18, 22-23.
185. IL at 22. In Cambodia, the Cambodian government and resistance fighters call
landmines "eternal sentinels" because they act like mechanical soldiers, always ready to
attack and never requiring sleep. Id
186. Id. at 9. The Human Rights Watch Arms Project noted that "[riecent evidence
taken from a number of countries shows that mines are increasingly used a'; part of deliber-
ate military strategies to spread terror among civilians and keep them away from their
homes and sources of food." Id. at 5.
187. See supra Part IV for a more detailed discussion of international humanitarian law.
188. See Chris Giannou, M.D. & Jack Geiger, M.D., The Medical Lessons of Land Mine
Injuries, in CLEARING THm FIELDS, supra note 3, at 138.
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Mine wounds are dirty and contaminated. The blast not only tears
through tissues, bums, and coagulates; it also drives soil, grass,
metal, or plastic fragments of the mine and pieces of shoes and
clothing up into the leg, burrowing between tissue planes and often
causing severe secondary infection. These same foreign materials,
plus bone fragments of the shattered foot, can also be blown up into
the patient's genitals, buttocks, or arms.lS 9
As a military weapon, landmines are deliberately designed to
maim without killing, and to burden an enemy's medical organization
while deflating troop morale.190 The use of a weapon that inflicts this
type of injury violates international legal principles of necessity and
proportionality, by inflicting excessive pain and suffering on its vic-
tims 191 When civilians become the target of landmine use, violations
of these principles become even more apparent.
Both the operation and effects of landmine use violate interna-
tional humanitarian law. Due to the indiscriminate effects and inflic-
tion of excessive injury, the landmine should be categorically banned
as a weapon of war.
V. Inadequate Landmine Regulation: Disproportionate
Effects on Civilians in Developing Countries
Because landmines are often used in internal conflicts, civilians in
the developing world have become recurrent victims of the global
landmine crisis over the last two decades.192 The continent of Africa
is the most mined region of the world, with eighteen to thirty million
mines laid in eighteen African countries.1 93 Afghanistan, Cambodia,
and Angola have the largest landmine problem, collectively harboring
approximately twenty-eight million landmines and suffering twenty-
two thousand casualties every year.' 4 Due to the egregious injuries
caused by landmines, civilians who step on them lose at least one limb
to the exploding mine, if they survive the blast.195 As a result, ampu-
tees are common in developing countries, where landmines are most
189. Id. at 140.
190. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 22 (noting that "[a]n injured soldier in a
minefield crying for help can demoralize his comrades"). Id.
191. See infra Part III.A.
192. See Mintz, supra note 159, at Al (noting that landmine use "has bcome [more]
widespread only since about 19S0, as more third world nations began making them and
their cost dropped.").
193. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 143.
194. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 4, at 1.
195. See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 126.
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prevalent.196 In Cambodia, 1 out of every 236 people i:s an amputee
due to a mine explosion.197 In Angola, 1 in every 470 is an amputee
due to a landmine injury.198 By comparison, the amputation rate in
the United States is 1 for every 22,000 Americans, and none are
caused by landmines.' 99
As a result, the developing world must shoulder the high eco-
nomic and social costs of civilian landmine casualties. Unfortunately,
these poor countries are the least able to cope with landmines indis-
criminately laid within their borders. Clearing landmines is very ex-
pensive, especially for poor, developing countries.2°° For example, a
landmine can be purchased for $3 but can require nearly $1000 to re-
move.201 Furthermore, approximately $5000 is necessary for the treat-
ment and rehabilitation of each civilian landmine victim.202 The
United Nations estimates that with an average cost for mine clearance
of $200 to $1000 per mine, every Cambodian would have to devote
every penny of their $200 Gross Domestic Product per capita for the
next one to five years in order to finance complete clearance of the 9
million mines currently laid in Cambodia.2 °3 Only Kuwait has been
able to afford to de-mine much of its country, but that came only at a
cost of $800 million and the lives of eighty de-miners.2 4 Countries in
the developing world cannot afford to do the same. As a result, civil-
ians in poor, developing countries are especially vulnerable to injury
from landmines that cannot be removed due to lack of government
funds to pay mine clearance teams. Without better regulation or a
total ban on the use and production of landmines, civilians will remain
vulnerable to the indiscriminate effects of these weapons.
A. Landmines Prevent Peace-Building in Developing Countries
Due to their delayed-action operation, landmines prevent polit-




199. Id. This statistic is based on figures available in 1989 and a U.S. population of 220
million people. Id
200. See Mintz, supra note 159, at Al.
201. Id.
202. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 4, at 1.
203. Id at 14.
204. Vance & Okun, supra note 8, at 200. These deaths number greater than all the
American troops killed in the Gulf War. AL
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armed conflict has ended 05 According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
"by neutralizing essential infrastructure, mines present a virtually in-
superable obstacle to post-conflict peace-building."t' 6 The ICRC ex-
plained that: "Landmines make it more difficult for countries to
negotiate the hazardous transition from conflict to peace and recov-
ery. '2 7 In an ICRC study,
[T]he presence of landmines in Central America [posed] an addi-
tional obstacle to the already difficult peace process taking place in
various countries there. . . .Expensive mine-clearance activities
must be added to the list of urgent budget priorities such as public
health, unemployment, and education. Lack of funds for these so-
cial needs is already the cause of a soaring crime rate and general
climate of insecurity. This is a political powder keg which, if solu-
tions are not found, might destroy the fragile peace that has re-
turned to this region.20 s
In heavily-mined Mozambique, the U.S. Department of State has pre-
dicted that "nation-building efforts ... will be heavily dependent upon
the success of UN and other demining operations. " '" Landmines
therefore encourage political instability and undermine a new govern-
ment's legitimacy.210 Furthermore, the continuing prevalence of
landmines in developing countries prevents repatriation of refugees
once the armed conflict has ended, further hindering post-conflict
peace-building efforts.21
B. Landmine Use Has Detrimental Effects on the Economy in
Developing Countries
Developing countries rely heavily on farming and other agricul-
tural activities as the base for their economies: t22
[Iln underdeveloped, mainly rural countries where mine warfare is
common, the presence of live mines means that agriculture and pas-
toral endeavors will be significantly restricted. The aggregate nega-
205. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 23 (describing strategic placement of landmines
in Afghanistan aimed at undermining civilian support for the Mujahideen).
206. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 4, at S.
207. ICRC Overview, supra note 4.
208. Id.
209. See Brian Owsley, Landmines and Human Rights: Holding Producers Accountable,
21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & Co.s. 203, 213 n.53 (1995).
210. See Deadly Legacy, supra note 5, at 23.
211. ld. at 133-39. For a more detailed discussion of the effects landmines on refugee
populations, see HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 4, at 9-11.
212. Id. at 133.
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tive effect on national economies, particularly in countries without a
large industrial base, of a reduction in such activities can be quite
significant.213
One development official in Cambodia noted that "[e]conomic devel-
opment in Cambodia is heavily dependent on the speed in which
mines can be cleared - and that could take not years, but decades.2 14
The indiscriminate use of landmines on farmland and grazing
land disrupts a developing country's food production and has dire ef-
fects on its civilians, who must return to their land to farm or graze
animals in order to survive.215 After the armed conflict, civilians come
home to landmine-ridden areas where they attempt to farm or send
cattle to graze, only to be injured or killed by exploding mines.2 16
In addition, where landmines are present, the land becomes un-
productive, further contributing to both a loss of subsistence agricul-
ture to civilians and a decrease in the national economy.2 17
Additional Protocol I prohibits military action that will "attack, de-
stroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of
the civilian population, such as food-stuffs, agricultural areas for the
production of food-stuffs, crops, [and] livestock .... 21,s The debilitat-
ing effect landmines have on arable land in developing countries
stands in clear violation of Additional Protocol I.
The prevalence of landmines also disrupts the infrastructure of
developing countries and further destabilizes their national econo-
mies. Utilities and transportation systems are rendered unusable by
landmines2 19 In Mozambique, landmines have blocked the operation
of twenty-eight roads in the country."2 The U.S. Department of State
observed: "The disruption of the transportation system produced by
even a few mines results in local scarcities of products, lessened ex-
213. 111
214. Id. at 134.
215. 1d. at 118, 131-32.
216. See id.
217. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 117. Landmines render land unusable. Id. For
example, in Libya during World War H, 87% of its rangelands were declared unusable due
to the presence of landmines. Id. By 1980, only 67% could be declared safe. Id. In Af-
ghanistan, the United Nations estimates that it will take 15 years to clear priority zones,
using 31 de-mining teams. Id.
218. Additional Protocol I, supra note 60, art. 54(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27, 16 I.L.M. at
1414.
219. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 133.
220. HIDDEN KILLERS, supra note 4, at 48.
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ports and balances of hard currency they bring, inflation, and some-
times famine."'"
Additionally, the high number of landmines in developing coun-
tries discourages foreign investment, which is much needed to help
developing countries rebuild during the post-war period. Perhaps
more unfortunately, humanitarian relief efforts are also discouraged
from entering developing nations plagued by landmines, for fear of
injury to their workers.113
Finally, the concentration of landmines in developing countries
has long-lasting destructive effects on the natural environment in
these countries. This, in turn, negatively affects developing economies
by reducing the quantity of productive land in these countries. Addi-
tional Protocol I prohibits methods of warfare "which are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage
to the natural environment"' z 4 and "may be expected to cause such
damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the
health or survival of the population."' - These provisions apply to the
use of landmines and further justify a total ban on the use and produc-
tion of landmines as the only way to protect the environment in devel-
oping countries from the destructive effects of landmine use. '
C. Negative Social Effects Resulting from Landmine Use
Landmines also have devastating effects on a developing coun-
try's social institutions and society. The egregious nature of the injury
inflicted by landmines drains the already strained healthcare systems
in developing countries2 7 Surgery is very expensive, almost prohibi-
tive for poor civilians, and specialized training is required to properly
attend to the victims of landmines. 2 In addition, poor transportation
systems and the scant number of hospitals in developing countries
221. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 133.
222. See Mintz, supra note 159, at Al (stating that analysts predict "landmines will dis-
courage investors from rebuilding the country.").
223. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 139-40.
224. Additional Protocol I, supra note 60, art. 35(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21, 16 I.L.M. at
1409.
225. Id art. 55(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 28, 16 I.L.M. at 1415. Article 55(1) provides that
"[care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread,
long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods
or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the
natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population." Id.
226. DEADLY LEGAcy, supra note 5, at 310-12.
227. See Giannou & Geiger, supra note 188, at 142.
228. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 128.
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contribute to increased infection among landmine victims, many of
whom are delayed for as long as twenty-four hours before receiving
medical attention.2 9 Once a victim arrives at the hospital, medicine
and blood are in short supply. 3 In Cambodia, families of landmine
victims cannot rely on health insurance to cover medical costs.3'
They must pay blood donors, doctors, nurses, and the cost of
medicines themselves, an enormous strain on their average annual in-
come of two hundred dollars. 32
In addition, most landmine victims who survive aust undergo
amputation of one or more limbs.3 3 Although amputees require arti-
ficial limbs, the cost is beyond the reach of most civilians in develop-
ing countries.2 4 In addition, societal discrimination against amputees
is very strong in developing countries. Whereas in the United States,
landmine victims may be described as "physically challenged" or "dis-
abled," in developing countries amputees are considered mutilated
cripples whose disability poses a drain on society.235 Unable to find
work, landmine amputees are perceived as unproductive members in
a labor-intensive society.236 They are "viewed by government officials
and police as an unpleasant nuisance to society and arrested, or even
worse, 'disappeared."'
237
VI. The Special Impact Landmines Have on Children
Children are especially vulnerable to injury from landmines.
They are at greater risk of physical injury from exploding landmines
because their bodies are smaller and "closer to the centre of the




232. I at 129. One Cambodian farmer who lost a leg during a landmine blast said he
was not sure what was worse: losing a leg or knowing his wife had gone to relatives and
friends to beg for money to pay for his hospital care. Id.
233. Id. at 126.
234. The average cost of an artificial limb is $125, and should be replaced every three to
five years for adults. Id. at 130.
235. Giannou & Geiger, supra note 188, at 142. The authors explain that "[iun the
bleak poverty of war-ravaged societies of the Third World, no euphemism is possible.
These people are seen (and see themselves) as cripples; they have been mutilated. They
cannot help their families eke out an existence, or provide food or the fuel for its cooking
236. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 132.
237. Id.
238. SCOURGE ON CHILDREN, supra note 11, at 7.
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This six-year-old Cambodian refugee girl is only one of many Cambodians left ampu-
tees by landmine blasts.
© Eric Pradat. Reprinted by permission. Published in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS PROJECT
AND PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LANDMINES: A DEADLY LEGACY (Human Rights Watch
ed. 1993).
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wide, there is approximately one landmine for every twenty children
in the world.239 In El Salvador, seventy-five percent of the landmine
victims are children. 240 In Angola, twenty thousand of the country's
amputees are women and children.24'
In one British study of thirteen ICRC hospitals in Africa and
Asia, many of the victims studied were children.242 The study noted
that "children seem to be susceptible to [landmine injury], lending
support to rumours that they may be used to walk ahead of combat-
ants in areas where there is a risk of mines; other children may be
tempted to pick up mines that have been dropped by air."243 With the
indiscriminate use of landmines so prevalent in the developing world,
children are at a greater risk of injury from landmines than ever
before. In addition, children are particularly vulnerable to landmine
injury because they are dependent on their parents for survival; if one
or both parents is injured or killed by landmines, it is their children
who will suffer.
A. The Growing International Movement to Protect Children
During Armed Conflicts
In the last three years, an international movement 244 has
emerged, encouraging a ban on the use and production of landmines
in the name of the world's children. In 1993, the U:nited Nations
Commission on Human Rights passed a resolution addressing, in part,
the effect landmines have on children during armed conflict.245 The
resolution notes "with distress that children are often among the main
victims of . . . antipersonnel mines" and "invites [the international
community] ... to intensify their efforts to ensure that all possible
239. Id. at 5.
240. William D. Montalbano, UNICEF Announces Anti-War Agenda, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
12, 1995, at A8.
241. Id
242. See Robin Coupland & Adrian Korver, Injuries from Anti-personnel Mines: The
Experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 303 BRIT. MuD. J. 1509 (1991),
reprinted in DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 433.
243. Id. at 438.
244. The international movement to protect children during armed conflict addresses
not only the effect that landmines have on children, but also the practice of using children
as soldiers when they are aged 15 and younger, and the practice of raping girls during
warfare as a means of "ethnic cleansing." See CmLDREN 1996, supra note 4, at 14, 16, 18-
19.
245. Consequences of Armed Conflicts on Children's Lives, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.,
49th Sess., Agenda Item 30, at 2, U.N.Doc. E/CN.4/1993 (1993) reprinted in DEADLY LEO-
ACY, supra note 5, at 452, 453-54.
[Vol. 20:135
Affirming Our Common Humanity
assistance is given to child victims of anti-personnel mines, who are
often disabled for life, with a view to their physical and psychological
recovery and social reintegration .... 2 4
In December 1993, the General Assembly passed a resolution
commissioning a United Nations study of the impact of armed conflict
on children.247 The study Will address four areas of concern, including
the protection of children in situations of armed conflict and the indis-
criminate use of antipersonnel landmines on children. 24s Headed by
Graga Machel of Mozambique, the study is scheduled to issue its final
report, to be considered by the U.N. General Assembly, in November
1996.249
UNICEF has been very active in campaigning against landmines
on behalf of children. In its 1996 State of the World's Children Re-
port, UNICEF recognized the special danger posed by landmine use
to the lives of children in developing countries.251 In response,
UNICEF has presented an antiwar agenda in its report, advocating a
ban on "the production, use, stockpiling, sale and export of antiper-
sonnel mines" and establishing a boycott of "companies manufactur-
ing or selling landmines."' 1
B. Landmine Use Violates the Convention on the Rights of
the Child
Children's rights are protected under international law in the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (the "Chil-
dren's Convention").32 Article 38(1) of the Children's Convention
provides that "States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure re-
spect for the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to
them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child."213 Landmine
use violates this and several other provisions of the Children's Con-
vention. Because the Children's Convention has been almost unani-
246. Id.
247. UNrrED NATIONS, United Nations Study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Chil-
dren (visited Dec. 1, 1996) <http.//wn.apc.orgfmstudy>.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. CHmDREnN 1996, supra note 4, at 41.
251. Id. at 26-29.
252. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. AJRES!44,25,
Dec. 12, 1989, 28 LL.M. 1454 [hereinafter Children's Convention]. The Convention has
been almost unanimously accepted, with 157 countries ratifying the Convention as of 1994.
SCOURGE ON CHRDREN, supra note 11, at S.
253. Children's Convention, supra note 252, art. 38(1), 28 I.L.M. at 1470. Article 3S
also protects children from being recruited as soldiers. Id.
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mously adopted by the international community,2 it serves as
another basis for implementing a total ban on the use and production
of landmines.
1. The Right to Live and Play
Article 6 of the Children's Convention ensures "that every child
has the inherent right to life" and requires that members "shall ensure
to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the
child."255 Children's small physical size makes them particularly vul-
nerable to the blast from an exploding landmine and therefore un-
likely to survive once hit.256 Under Article 6 of the Children's
Convention, member states must ensure the survival of children." 7
Implicit in this provision is a mandate to clear all mines in areas where
children may be, and to provide children with mine awareness educa-
tion programs to protect them from the dangers of landmines. 58
Encompassed in their right to life is children's right to play. Arti-
cle 31 of the Children's Convention "recognizes the right of the child
to rest and leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities appro-
priate to the age of the child .... ,259 Because landrnines are laid
indiscriminately and often land in civilian areas where children live
and play, landmines "often injure children at play who are unaware,
careless, or ignorant of the danger" posed by landmines.260
Furthermore, the design of some landmines is particularly appeal-
ing to children. For example, the "butterfly mine" resembles a toy
airplane because it is designed with wings and filled with explosives
that allow it to float to the ground without detonating." 'i In Afghani-
stan where these landmines were remotely-delivered by the millions,
one million children were killed or injured by landmines.2 2 Children
254. UNICEF, Status: The First Nearly Universally Ratified Human Rights Treaty in
History (visited Dec. 1, 1996) <http://www.unicef.org/crc/status.htm> (reporting that only
six countries have not yet become a party to the Convention: United States, Switzerland,
Cook Islands, Oman, Somalia, and the United Arab Emirates).
255. Children's Convention, supra note 252, art. 6, 28 I.L.M. at 1460.
256. SCOURGE ON CHILDREN, supra note 11, at 9 (noting that children "are unlikely to
survive because their small bodies are so vulnerable. Most will be killed outright, but some
will die in excruciating pain before medical treatment can be given."). Id.
257. Children's Convention, supra note 252, art. 6, 28 I.L.M. at 1460.
258. SCOURGE ON CHILDREN, supra note 11, at 10.
259. Children's Convention, supra note 252, art. 31(1), 28 I.L.M. at 1460.
260. SCOURGE ON CHILDREN, supra note 11, at 13.
261. Id. at 17.
262. Stephen Chapman, Ban Wouldn't Make World Give Up Mines, POST AND COU.
RIER (Charleston, S.C.), Feb. 6, 1996, at A9.
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refer to these landmines as "green parrots" because of their toy-like
shape.263 However, when pressure is applied to the wings of the
landmine, it detonates and despite the small amount of explosives in
these mines, it is enough to blow off a child's hand.2 ' 4 Other
landmines resemble toys, such as pineapples or stones.&' 5 These in-
triguing shapes capture a child's inherent curiosity, ultimately placing
children at risk of injury and violating their right to play in a safe
environment.266
2. The Right to Special Care
Where children suffer landmine injury and survive, they generally
become amputees. 267 The Children's Convention grants disabled chil-
dren the right to special care.2 6s Article 23 states that "a mentally or
physically disabled child should enjoy a full and decent life, in condi-
tions which ensure dignity, promote self-reliance and facilitate the
child's active participation in the community."'2 69 As such, children in
developing countries should enjoy the right to receive state assistance
in obtaining artificial limbs. The cost of prosthetics is prohibitive for
most poor families,270 and without some type of financial aid, children
will have to go without. For example, a ten year-old with a life expec-
tancy of forty to fifty years will need twenty-five artificial limbs in his
lifetime.271 These limbs must be replaced every six months, because
as the child ages, the bone of the amputation stump grows more rap-
idly than the surrounding skin and soft tissues.172 The child might also
require additional surgery to fit the artificial limb over the stump?27
Therefore, over his or her lifetime, the price of a child's artificial limbs
263. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 298.
264. SCOURGE ON CHiLDREN, supra note 11, at 17.
265. Id. at 13.
266. Id. Interestingly, although Additional Protocol I does not explicitly address chil-
dren, the Landmine Protocol gives children special protection under its absolute prohibi-
tion against booby traps "attached to or associated w ith ... children's tos or other
portable objects or products specially designed for the feeding, health, hygeine, clothing or
education of children." Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, art. S., 1342 U.N.T.S. at 171, 19
I.L.M. at 1532.
267. See supra Part V (discussing the medical care of landmine victims).
268. Children's Convention, supra note 252, art. 23, 28 LL.M. at 1465.
269. Id.
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will come to an estimated total cost of $3125, a financial impossibility
for poor children and their families.274
Furthermore, children in poor countries are already at greater
risk of health problems and early death due to the strained and lim-
ited public healthcare systems in place in developing countries.275 Al-
ready, nine million children under the age of five, the majority of
whom live in poor, developing countries, die every year from prevent-
able disease, with one thousand of these children dying every hour. 76
Because children are at greater risk of injury from landmines due to
their smaller size, a child suffering the effects of a landraine blast will
pose an additional burden on health care for children in these poor
countries and will draw scarce resources away from current efforts to
protect children through preventive healthcare. 277 Future generations
of children would be saved these social and economic costs if the in-
ternational community were to adopt a total ban on the. use and pro-
duction of landmines.
3. The Right to Family Life
The Preamble of the Children's Convention recognizes that "the
child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personal-
ity, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of hap-
piness, love and understanding." 78 During armed conflicts, many
children are orphaned.279 The prevalence of landmines places chil-
dren at risk of losing one or both of their parents to landmine explo-
sions.280 Because children are dependent on their parents for survival,
they are especially vulnerable to the effects landmines have on civil-
ians. The prevalence of landmines in civilian areas of developing
countries jeopardizes children's right to family life. Additionally, the
prohibitive cost of healthcare for landmine victims places the survival
of the victim's entire family at risk.281 The medical care for landmine
victims can extend over a long period of time, and
274. Md.
275. Id. at 142.
276. See Giannou & Geiger, supra note 188, at 142 (discussing the results of UNICEF's
1993 State of the World's Children report.).
277. Id.
278. Children's Convention, supra note 252, preamble, 28 I.L.M. at 1457.
279. CHILDREN 1996, supra note 4, at 13 (stating that more than I million children have
been orphaned or separated from their parents during armed conflicts in the last decade).
280. Id.
281. SCOURGE ON CHILDREN, supra note 11, at 13.
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[flor families without a regular income, difficult choices have to be
made. A recent survey in Cambodia found that many hospitals re-
quired the victim's family to provide all supplies and medicines
needed, and even the fuel to run the generator during the operation.
Livestock, sometimes the family's only marketable asset, may have
to be sold, thus putting the family's very survival in jeopardy.
Furthermore, Article 32 of the Children's Convention mandates a
safe working environment for children, where they are protected from
performing any work that is hazardous to the child's health.233 The
prevalence of landmines in the rural areas where children work places
them at great risk of injury in violation of Article 32. For example, in
a 1993 ICRC study, it was discovered that child casualties in Kabul,
Afghanistan were particularly high because the fields around the city
where the children grazed their families' flocks were heavily mined.'4
In light of these provisions, landmines must be banned to ensure
children are allowed to enjoy the rights to which they are entitled
under the Children's Convention. Therefore, to protect the children
in the developing world as mandated by the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, international humanitarian law, and Additional Protocol
I, the international community must enforce a total ban on the use
and production of landmines.
VII. Proposals for Change in the International Community:
How to Protect Civilians and Children
from Landmines
The only truly effective way to protect civilians and children in
developing countries from the devastating effects of landmines is to
enact a total ban on the use, production, transfer, stockpiling, and
trade of antipersonnel landmines. The work of the ICRC and other
nongovernmental institutions in the developing world has helped pre-
vent civilian landmine injury. However, their work alone will not stop
the global landmine crisis. The international community must recog-
nize the magnitude of the landmine crisis in the developing world and
fashion remedies to help civilians and children in these countries. Un-
fortunately, during the 1996 Review Conference of the Conventional
Weapons Convention, the international community failed to consider
the widespread effect of landmine use on civilians in the developing
282. Id.
283. CrHLDPR 's CoNvm ZrroN, supra note 252, art. 32(1), 28 I.LM. at 1463.
284. SCOURGE ON CHILDREN, supra note 11, at 14.
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world, largely due to a focus on military, rather than humanitarian,
concerns. In light of the Conference's failure to reach a total ban on
the use and production of landmines, additional steps must be taken
by the international community to protect civilians and children from
the devastating effects of landmine use.
A. Proposed Legal Change
1. To Ensure Children and Civilians are Protected from
Landmine Injury, a Total Ban on Use and
Production Must be Enacted
The only way to ensure that children and civilians will be pro-
tected from landmines' destructive effects is to enact a total ban on
the use, production, transfer, stockpiling, and trade of antipersonnel
landmines. Just as various classes of weaponry have been banned
from use because of their indiscriminate effects on civilians, 8 5
landmines should also be banned.
In addition, production of landmines must be stopped in order to
effectively halt the use and deployment of landmines in developing
countries. Landmine production is big business, with an estimated
value of $50 to $200 million per year.28 6 Even landmine clearance has
become an industry.2s7 The United States, China, Italy, and the for-
mer Soviet Union are the leading developers and producers of anti-
285. The international community has categorically banned weapons considered to vio-
late the principles of international humanitarian law: chemical and biological weapons
have been banned based on these weapons' ability to inflict unnecessary suffering on their
victims. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 314. More recently, blinding laser weapons
were banned from use during the 1996 Review Conference of the Conventional Weapons
Convention. ICRC Third Session, supra note 25 (discussing the agreement of member
states to ban both the use and transfer of laser weapons specifically designed to blind). In
this legal tradition, landmines should be categorically banned as a weapon, the use of
which is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind," Biological Weapons -Convention, supra
note 80, preamble, 26 U.S.T. at 585, 11 I.L.M. at 311, and "violates the principles of hu-
manity and ... the dictates of public conscience." Additional Protocol I, supra note 60, art.
1(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 7, 16 I.L.M. at 1386-97.
286. The Human Rights Watch Arms Project estimates that at an average cost of $10
per mine, and 5 to 10 million mines sold per year, the total annual value of landmine sales
would total $50 to $100 million. Id. at 57. UNICEF estimates that 10 million antipersonnel
landmines are produced every year and valued at $200 million. SCOURGE ON CHILDREN,
supra note 11, at 21. These estimates are likely to be low, considering the secrecy normally
associated with military trading. Id.
287. Many landmine producers are entering the profitable field of commercial de-min-
ing. See SCOURGE ON CHILDREN, supra note 11, at 21. For example, Kuwait awarded a
$100 million de-mining contract to a subsidiary of Daimler-Benz in Germany. Id. The cost
of such private de-mining contracts is out of the reach of poor developing countries who
most need these services.
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personnel landmines s  Furthermore, many well-known companies
contribute to landmine production by supplying parts to producers.' ;
So long as it is profitable to make and sell landmines, they will likely
continue to be purchased and used in developing countries and there-
fore continue to put civilians at risk. The international community
should support and join UNICEF's boycott of these producers and
companies who contribute to the production of landmines.
As long as landmines can be purchased cheaply on an open mar-
ket, warring parties, especially in developing countries, will continue
to use landmines because they act as cheap and effective force multi-
pliers to compensate for and augment a shortage in soldiers.'' J The
international community cannot continue to allow landmine produ-
cers to profit from the production of this destructive weapon. Without
a ban on both the use and production of landmines, developing coun-
tries will continue to bear the brunt of the landmine crisis, at an eco-
nomic and social cost they cannot afford.
2. In Lieu of a Total Ban: Other Proposals for Legal Change
As previously discussed, the Review Conference of the Conven-
tional Weapons Convention did not produce a total ban on the use
and production of landmines. In the interest of children and other
288. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 53-54. However, Italy has recently announced
that it will "once and for all" end the production and export of antipersonnel landmines
and begin destroying additional devices "in the hope that such measures will lead to an
international ban on production of landmines." Evelyn Leopold, Italy Renounces ProJur-
tion, Export of Landmines, Reuters News Service, Sept. 26, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Reuwld File (quoting Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini in a speech to the
United Nations General Assembly).
289. For example, Motorola has supplied parts for landmines used and deployed in
Cambodia. NOVA: Landmines in Cambodia, (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 10, li)
(transcript available in LEXIS, News Library, Jgtran File). In response to the NOVA tele-
vision broadcast, Motorola recently pledged that the company will not "knowinfiy Sell"
one of its switches, that serves as an integral part of a landmine's operation, to landmine
manufacturers or to companies that supply them. Motorola Joins Land Mine Fight; TzJz-
nology" New Policy Bans Sale of a Common Switch to Companies that Ma:e or Supply the
Weapons, L.A. Tirams, Oct. 1, 1996, at D19. Nevertheless, as of this vriting, other w;ell-
known American companies continue to contribute to landmine production. Several U.S.
companies, including Magnavox and RCA, participate in the manufacture or desi.-n of
mines. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 72-73. Alliant Technology, which has produced
scatterable mines for the U.S. Army, is linked through cooperative research, production,
and marketing agreements to other well-knownm companies, including IBM, \VestinghouSe,
General Electric, and AT&T. Id. at 75.
290. See DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 22 (discussing the use of landmines in Cam-
bodia to compensate for "the low force-to-space ratio typical of insurgency-counterin-
sugency and many internal wars.").
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civilians who are at great risk of injury from landmines, the interna-
tional community should consider unilaterally implementing the fol-
lowing proposals for legal change that were rejected by the Review
Conference. Until a total ban is enacted, individual statns should con-
sider unilaterally imposing these limitations on lancmine use and
production.
a. Transparency on All Production and Transfer of Landmines
Should Be Required
The participants of the Review Conference failed to implement a
better system for enforcing and verifying compliance with the provi-
sions in the Landmine Protocol.291 The international community, act-
ing through an international regulatory organization created for this
purpose, should impose a duty on member states to report the produc-
tion and sale of landmines throughout the world.292 This procedure
would identify those who produce and trade landmines, as well as
those who receive and purchase them. Furthermore, such a procedure
would ensure that all landmines produced and traded internationally
conform with regulations in the revised Landmine Protocol.
b. Self-Destructing or Self-Neutralizing Devices Should Be
Required in All Landmines
Currently, the Landmine Protocol requires only self-destructing
or self-neutralizing mechanisms on remotely delivered landmines.29 3
Although the revised Protocol requires self-destructing or self-neu-
tralizing devices on a greater number of landmines, the requirement
will not become effective for at least ten years, and ther will only ap-
ply to landmines deployed outside marked, fenced, or guarded areas
and to remotely delivered mines that would be difficult or impossible
to record.294 Therefore, in order to be effective, states should act uni-
laterally to require implementation of self-destructing or self-neutral-
izing mechanisms on all landmines produced within their territory.
This action will help to reduce the risk of indiscriminate injury to chil-
dren and other civilians by eliminating landmines' delayed-reaction
operation. Unfortunately, merely placing such devices into landmines
291. See ICRC Third Session, supra note 25.
292. See Falk, supra note 49, at 83-84.
293. See Landmine Protocol, supra note 24, art. 5(1)(b), 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169,19 I.L.M.
at 1531. The effectiveness of this prohibition is questionable, however, in light of its broad
exceptions.
294. See ICRC Third Session, supra note 25.
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may not adequately protect civilians because all too often these de-
vices malfunction. 95 Furthermore, adding self-destructing or self-
neutralizing mechanisms to landmines significantly raises the price of
the landmine, a concern harbored by developing countries that want
to preserve the landmine as an inexpensive weapon of destruction.2 1
To remedy this situation and protect civilians in developing countries
from the effects of landmines, minimum design standards for self-
destructing or self-neutralizing mechanisms should be set by the inter-
national community and enforced by an international regulatory or-
ganization. To protect civilians effectively in poorer countries, the
requisite technology for these mechanisms should be distributed to
developing countries at a reduced price through a shared technology
plan.297
c. All Undetectable Landmines Should Be Banned
An increasing number of landmines are being produced with very
little metal content or with entirely plastic parts, making them nearly
impossible to detect by mine clearance teams.2 98 Unfortunately, the
Review Conference did not mandate that all landmines be detecta-
ble.299 The revised Landmine Protocol requires detectability only for
"dumb" landmines, defined as, those not equipped with self-destruct-
ing or self-neutralizing devices. Requiring increased metal in
landmines would facilitate mine clearing efforts3uO Individual coun-
tries should unilaterally require that landmines produced in their terri-
tory contain enough metal to be detectable by mine clearing teams.
Admittedly, the effectiveness of such a requirement would be limited
because most landmine clearance is performed by manually probing
the ground for mines, rather than using metal detection devices to find
295. Because humanitarian mine clearance should require a 99.9% rate of destruction
of landmines, it is essential that such devices actually work. See DEADLY LEGoCvv supra
note 5, at 29. However, at an ICRC Symposium of military experts in April 1993, mine
experts cited a likely 10% failure rate for self-destructing or self-neutralizing mechanisms.
Id at 345 n.22.
296. See id. at 345-46.
297. Falk, supra note 49, at 83.
298. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5. at 342-43 (noting that "the next generation of
antipersonnel mines may be completely undetectable by the present generation of elec-
tronic mine detectors."). All-plastic landmines are currently produced by several nations,
including Italy and China. Id. However, Italy recently has renounced the production and
use of antipersonnel landmines. See Leopold, supra note 28.
299. See ICRC Third Session, supra note 25. See also Part III.B.
300. Sandoz, supra note 50, at 190-91.
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mines.310 Nevertheless, requiring that landmines be detectable would
assist future mine clearing efforts considerably.
d. Allocate Responsibility for Clearance of Landmines
Although the participants to the Review Conference allocated re-
sponsibility for clearance 3°2 to those who deploy landmines, they did
not go far enough. To protect civilian interests adequately after an
armed conflict has ended, the international community must require
that all sides of the armed conflict take responsibility for landmines
that were laid during the conflict. Furthermore, both sides should be
required to assist a specially-created international body in clearing all
landmines laid during the war. This international mine-clearing body
should be funded by the international community as a whole, with the
majority of funds contributed by countries and private companies that
are large producers and exporters of landmines. This organization
should provide funds to subsidize the high cost of landmine clearance
for developing countries, and to provide training to people in develop-
ing countries so that they will eventually be able to clear landmines
without international assistance. 3  Additionally, requirel transfers of
mine clearing technology to developing countries at :reduced cost
would further protect civilians and children from landmines' effects.30 4
B. Beyond Legal Change: Humanitarian Proposals to Protect
Children and Civilians in Developing Countries from
Landmine Injury
Recognizing the deficiencies in international regulation of
landmine use, the international community must create and support
humanitarian programs that will protect children and civilians in de-
veloping countries. The following programs should be funded by the
international community, with the bulk of the financial burden placed
on those countries who produce and export landmines to developing
countries.
301. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 343.
302. ICRC Third Session, supra note 25.
303. These training programs might be modeled after currently implemented mine
clearance programs such as the Cambodian Mine Action Centre. See HIDDEN KILLERS,
supra note 4, at 30-43 (describing several mine clearance programs worldwide).
304. See Thomas R. Evans, Technology Beyond the Probe, in CLEAR)No THE FIELDS,
supra note 3, at 124, 127 (concluding that "modest investments in the transfer of low-tech-
nology systems developed by military forces can produce high return in the Third World...
. The investment of a few tens of millions of dollars could have major results . ").
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1. International Mine-Clearing Programs
The international community must recognize the destructive ef-
fects of landmines and support all efforts to de-mine developing coun-
tries that cannot afford to pay the enormous price required. Although
the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations such as the
ICRC have established programs to help de-mine the most heavily
mined developing countries they "cannot bear the burden of demining
alone-they lack the resources and expertise. If humanity is to make
an impact on the global problem with uncleared landmines it is imper-
ative that the U.S., and the other industrialized nations, contribute
technology, expertise, and resources. ' 3 )5 Furthermore, an interna-
tional program would only serve as a starting point or template for
developing countries to implement their own de-mining programs.
For example, successful detaining programs in El Salvador and Cam-
bodia were initiated through international action, but included train-
ing programs designed to help those countries maintain de-mining
programs upon departure of the international program.'-",
2. Educational Programs for Children and Civilians to Raise
Awareness of Landmines and Their Dangers
Because of children's curiosity and the sheer number of
landmines present in developing countries, children are especially sus-
ceptible to injury from landmines3 7 Furthermore, because landmines
are so prevalent in some developing countries, children often do not
perceive landmines as dangerous and therefore do not hesitate to pick
them up.308 Without education on the dangers of landmines, children
remain extremely vulnerable to injury from a landmine blast.
The international community must fund and implement educa-
tional programs exposing the dangers of landmines. Such programs
are of great benefit to children. 0 9 One example of a successful educa-
tion program is the United Nations' and UNICEF's Mine Awareness
305. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 259 (describing the U.S. Department of State's
position with respect to international mine clearance).
306. See Kate Taylor & Terry J. Gander, Mine Clearance in Cambodia, I,.TL DEF.
Rnv., Feb. 1, 1996, at 5, available in LEXIS, World Library, Jande File (describing the
Cambodian Mine Action Centre); HmDEN KaL EIRs, supra note 4, at 30.43 (describing the
United States' Demining Assistance Program and de-mining efforts by international
organizations).
307. See supra Part VL
308. Id.
309. See CHILDREN 1996, supra note 4, at 27.
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and Accident Prevention Program in El Salvador.31 ° With the cooper-
ation of both sides of the conflict, the program began by identifying
areas where mines were prevalent.31' Next, the program attempted to
warn the population of the dangers of landmines by distributing pos-
ters and signs illustrated with pictures of landmines and instructions
on what to do upon encountering a landmine.312 In addition:
The posters were reinforced by an education and public awareness
campaign, through the press, television and radio. But each com-
munity also needed individual contact. A team of educators trav-
eled around meeting teachers, health promoters and NGO staff.
These volunteers were trained in mine awareness so they could
serve as 'multipliers' - visiting rural communities, giving talks illus-
trated by flip charts and distributing leaflets to each family.
313
This project resulted in a marked decrease in the number of injuries
from landmines in El Salvador.31 4 In 1992, there were 579 victims;
however, between January 1994 and May 1995, no landraine accidents
were reported.315
In addition to international clearance programs, individual coun-
tries should consider contributing to educational and mine-clearing
activities in the developing world. Several countries have successfully
implemented such programs, such as the U.S. Special Forces program
in Cambodia.1 6 These educational programs are essential to prevent
landmine injury to children and other civilians in the developing
world.
3. Unilateral Moratoriums on the Transfer, Production, Use, or
Sale of Antipersonnel Landmines
Although the international community as a whole may be unable
to agree to a total ban on the use and production of landmines, indi-
vidual countries can self-impose moratoriums to limit or completely
ban the use and production of landmines. As of 1996, forty-three
countries have expressed their support for a global ban on the produc-
tion, stockpiling, transfer, and use of antipersonnel landmines3 17 On
310. See id.; see also Jean, supra note 25, at 5.





316. See Terry & Gander, supra note 306.
317. ICRC, Progress Towards a Ban of Anti-personnel Landmines: Measures by Coun-
tries and Organizations (last modified Sept. 10, 1996) <http'/gvalnexl icrc.org/icrcnew,/
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March 2, 1995, Belgium became the first country to enact a law com-
pletely banning the manufacture, trade, use, and stockpiling of anti-
personnel mines, or any other weapon built for the same purpose on
its territory, even by its own army.'s The United States has declared
a three-year moratorium on landmine exports.319 During the Geneva
Session of the Review Conference, Switzerland announced its decision
to renounce the use of antipersonnel landmines.320 Other countries
have taken similar actions voluntarily, in response to the rising
number of landmines in the world and the grave danger they present
to civilian populations.321 Even in the absence of international agree-
ment, individual countries should be encouraged to renounce unilater-
ally the use and production of antipersonnel landmines.
VIII. Conclusion
The proliferation of landmines in the last twenty-five years has
had devastating effects on children and civilians in developing coun-
tries. Children are all too often the victims of exploding landmines:
In February 1992, two doctors from Physicians for Human Rights
examined a six-year-old boy at a hospital in Hargeisa, Northern
Somalia. Days earlier, the boy had picked up an object that looked
241e.htm> [hereinafter 1996 Progress Report]. These states include Afghanistan, France,
Germany, Japan, Cambodia, Mexico, United Kingdom, Nicaragua, and Canada. Id. The
United States is not included on this list. Id. Countries with comprehensive moratoria on
landmine exports include Argentina, Cambodia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Israel,
Italy, Japan, South Africa, and the United States. ICRC, Moratoria on Expors UfAntiper-
sonnel Mines as of March 1996, (last modified Mar. 6, 1996) <http:/lgvalnexlcrc.orgf
icrcnews/2a7a.htm> [hereinafter 1996 Moratoria Report]. Recently, Italy declared a ban
on the use and production of antipersonnel landmines. See Leopold, supra note 2S3.
318. ICRC Overview, supra note 4.
319. See Vance & Okun, supra note 8, at 202. Nevertheless, the United States has not
been entirely consistent in its opposition to antipersonnel landmines. For example, the
United States was one of only three countries to abstain from voting on the resolution
setting up the Review Conference because it opposed discussion of all aspects of the
landmine problem, including a total ban. Id. at 204. President Clinton explained this ac-
tion by stating that "[w]hile we fully supported the overall thrust of the resolution, we
could not vote for it because the U.S. Armed Forces continue to require landmines to
accomplish certain military missions." Ld. However, more recently, the United States ap-
pears inclined to favor a total ban on landmines. In a recent speech to the United Nations
General Assembly, President Clinton appealed "for the swift negotiation of a wvorldwid e
ban on the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines," commenting
that "[o]ur children deserve to walk this earth in safety." Leopold, supra note 28.
320. ICRC, Review Conference of the 1980 U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons: Geneva Session, 15-19 January 1996 (last modified Jan. 25, 1996) <httpyl
gvalnexl.icrc.orgicrcnewl38a6.htm>.
321. See 1996 Progress Report, supra note 317. See also 1996 Moratoria Report, supra
note 317.
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like "the plastic top of a thermos bottle" on a road near his home.
It turned out to be a small antipersonnel mine. The explosion
blinded the boy in both eyes, destroyed his right hand which was
subsequently amputated at the wrist, and left deep lesions on his
face and knees. Years earlier, the boy had lost his father in the civil
war. The boy's mother brought food to him at the hospital. She
told doctors she had four other children at home and was
destitute.
322
Unless the production and use of landmines is stopped. children and
other civilians in developing countries will continue to be injured by
these "weapons of mass destruction in slow motion.' '32 " A total ban
on the use, production, stockpiling, sale, and export of antipersonnel
landmines must be enacted by the international community, or en-
forced unilaterally by individual countries.
The United Nations estimates that at the current rate of mine
clearance, it will take 1100 years and cost $33 billion to clear the 110
million landmines currently deployed worldwide, assuming an imme-
diate halt in the current practice of placing between 2 to 5 million new
mines every year.3 24 The gravity of the global landmine crisis is real.
Every moment the international community fails to act, the situation
becomes more serious.
The ICRC has been the foremost supporter of a t.otal ban and
one of very few protectors of civilians in the developing world. 5 In
urging the international community to adopt a total ban on the use,
production, and trade of antipersonnel landmines, Cornelio Som-
maruga, the president of the ICRC, said recently: "As with chemical
weapons, success may take years or, as with apartheid, it may require
decades, but together we will succeed and in struggling to do so we
will not only be upholding fundamental norms of civilization, but also
affirming our own common humanity.
' '326
322. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 5, at 118-19.
323. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
324. Jean, supra note 25, at 3.
325. See Vance & Okun, supra note 8, at 205 (stating that "[t]he ICRC, which for years
has provided medical aid to land mine victims around the world, has be:n a leading force
against landmines."); Jan Eliasson, An International Approach Toward Humanitarian
Assistance and Economic Development of Countries Affected by Land Mines, in CLEARINo
THE FIELDS, supra note 3, at 165, 173 (discussing ICRC contributions tc the fight against
landmine injury in Cambodia).
326. Jean, supra note 25, at 3.
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